**Shitty Draft: Warning Shots**

* Introduction
  + State use of repression is a big, expansive issue.
    - Personal integrity rights violations
    - Restrictions on civil rights
    - political restrictions
    - Bureaucratic repression
    - Freedom of press
    - etc
  + Normatively, most people including myself view such violations as terrible tragedies that should be avoided.
  + However, central to providing effective recommendations or strategies for preventing or addressing human rights atrocities is understanding the underlying motivations for human rights violations. What are states seeking to get out of their repressive acts? Who is their audience? And why use repression instead of more peaceful methods?
  + In this article, I address these three questions within the specific context of state interactions with potential territorial challengers within their borders.
  + I select this subset for a variety of reasons:
    - First, by focusing on the emergence of territorial challengers, I identify a concrete event that is demonstrably harmful to the state’s survival. This makes the failure of the state’s repression clearly visible.
    - Second, with new data on territorial contenders from Lemke and Crabtree, I am able to study the emergence of these groups in more detail.
    - And third, the emergence of a territorial contender illustrates an extreme failure of the state in controlling its population.
  + This article will proceed as follows:
    - First, I will provide an overview regarding why states use repression and what we know about if repression “works”
    - Second, I will walk through the relationship and interaction between a state and potential dissident groups within its borders to illustrate how repression communicates the states intentions in the future as well as the states capacity.
    - Third, I will explain how we would anticipate territorial challengers to interpret the states behavior and how that perception should shape their behavior. From this, I will identify testable hypotheses.
    - Fourth, I will introduce the data and research design strategy I implement to test these hypotheses.
    - And finally, I will discuss my findings with focus on what it means for human rights situations more broadly. I will end by illustrating the next steps of this research path.
* The goal of the state – Survival first.
* States and territorial challengers – describing the relationship
  + Why not negotiate? Why repress?
  + The concept of state’s likelihood of imposing negative sanctions on their citizens being shaped by the threat the state perceives that group of citizens to be is not a new concept by any means (Davenport 1995 and more)
* What the potential challengers see
  + Until this point, I have focused solely on the risks territorial challengers pose to the state and how the state likely responds to said challengers. This excludes, however, the arguably most important actor in the interaction, namely the audience of the state’s repressive actions: the citizens and potential territorial challengers.
  + Does the target of the repression work?
    - Two ways of thinking about this:
      * Repression indicates the states repressive capacity and willingness to engage in future repression. In this case, the exact target of the repression is not important, rather just the visibility of the repression to the potential TCs
      * Repression is used to directly cripple the potential TC and prevent them from mobilizing and seizing territory. If this is the case, then
* Hypotheses
* Research Design
* Analysis
* Discussion
* Conclusion

The use of repression by states

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